If you listen to the right wing talk radio shows, what's at stake in Iraq is nothing less than our very existence and way of life. Whether you agree with this or not, if the American people believe the stakes are high enough and worth the sacrifice, I can provide a roadmap that provides both victory and an exit strategy in Iraq. First, we need to provide the military the manpower necessary to win (and, no, the 21,500 troops in the president's surge isn't going to do it); secondly the administration need to define what 'winning' looks like. Let's look at each in more detail.

General Petraeus' newly released manual on Counter Insurgency states the minimum ratio of civilians to security personal needed to maintain order is 50:1¹. These numbers are derived from empirical studies of past military conflicts by military experts and validated through actual experiences in places like Bosnia and Kosovo. With an estimated 27 million Iraqis², that translates to a recommended minimum of 540,000 security personnel. I'm sure it's with this formula in mind when, prior to the war on February 25, 2003, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki made his famous statement³ to the US Senate Armed Services Committee that predicted the need of several hundred thousand soldiers not to win the war, but to keep the peace. It is important to note that the required security force levels represent total levels, and not all those needed to be American troops, unless you do what the civilian Coalition Provisional Authority did when it disbanded all the Iraqi security forces immediately after combat ended in the de-Ba'athification process. Without any Iraqi security forces, that left 150,000 US troops and 23,000 coalition troops to maintain order in a population of 27 million: less than a third of what military doctrine states would be necessary. The results were predictable.

So where are we now⁴? Prior to the surge there are 134,700 Iraq Army troops and 188,300 Iraqi police forces. However, by the DOD's own estimate, only 85 Army units could be work independently or at least with American advisors; 21 could not. With the interior ministry forces (police), which are widely seen as heavily infiltrated by Shite extremists, only 7 units could operate independently or with American advisors and 38 could not. So if we only count those troops that are able to be fielded reliably, that gives us 110,500 Iraqi Army troops and only 28,300 reliable police personnel. Add in the 132,000 American troops in Iraq (prior to the surge) and the 14,100 coalition forces and you get total of 284,900 security forces in Iraq or just over half the number of troops the US military predicts would be needed to secure a country the size of Iraq. Based on the numbers alone, the addition of a paltry 21,500 troops won't make much of a difference.

There is military principle on the use of overwhelming force, which has been documented many times, from Sun Tzu to Carl von Clausewitz to the Powell Doctrine. The principle is an obvious one. Say you have a small kitchen fire and you call 911. The fire department doesn't show up with one fire fighter and a fire extinguisher: no, they show up in one or more trucks and a dozen fire fighters. Why? Because when dealing with a life and death situation, the last thing you want is a fair fight. You want to use every possible advantage you can get, including the use of overwhelming force. SWAT teams were created on that very principle: to provide a rapid response team that was able to use overwhelming force to get the bad guy. If 284,900 security personnel can't control Iraq, is 306,400 really going to do it?

If we are serious about winning we should provide at least the full complement of force as estimated by military doctrine: 540,000 troops. Anything less means we are not only unlikely to win, we are unnecessarily putting out troops in harm's way. Military analysts have pointed out that there are no more troops to be had, and if that's the case and Bush and the public really want to win in Iraq, then it's time for this country to make the sacrifices necessary: go on a war footing and initiate a draft.

The second half of the equation is defining winning. When will our troops know when the mission is accomplished? Remember the feud between the Sunnis and Shites has been simmering since 700 AD. Healing following a civil war takes a long time. Even in America, our civil war ended in 1865 but the sight of a confederate flag still touches raw nerves. We can't keep the warring sides apart forever. The administration has acknowledged that a political solution is required within Iraq to create a peaceful means of resolving their conflicts, sharing power, and sharing oil revenue. But it goes beyond this; the problem just isn't within Iraq. Even if Iraq is stabilized and quieted down, it will still be very weak. For the most part, Iraq doesn't have an air force, tanks, or the large guns necessary to protect itself from its neighbors. This weakness will leave Iraq susceptible to outside pressures and meddling. It's neighbors could be a powerful force for peace or for chaos. We need to begin discussions now to determine their intentions and to co-opt any corruptive influences, a point recommended by The Iraq Study Group. The NeoCons believe that negotiation is a sign of weakness, and their influence within the administration has caused the administration to reject any discussions solely on principle. If we don't find allies in the region that help guarantee Iraq's safety, we're going to be stuck in the middle east for a very long time. Clearly, finding political solutions within and outside Iraq are not going to be easy, and could be as difficult as separating the warring sides, but we will certainly fail unless the administration is willing to try to win.

If we fail on either the military or political fronts, Iraq will fail. The Bush Administration's half measures provide for neither the military or political efforts that are required. It's now up to the American people to decide if the stakes are high enough, and the Administration to take the difficult steps necessarily for victory. If not, it's time for the administration to admit defeat and it needs to start to explore how to minimize the fallout from a failed Iraq.

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Sources

¹Page 25, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf
²United Nations Development Program, Iraq Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation. Iraq 2004 Living Conditions Survey, Vol 1: Tabulation Report. New York: UNDP, 2005.
³http://www.fnsg.com/transorder.htm?tranid=20030225t1846
⁴All figures compiled by the Brooking’s Institute: http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.htm